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Visual mental imagery (which involves generating and transforming visual 
mental representations, i.e., seeing with the mind's eye) and visual attention 
appear to be distinct processes. However, some researchers have claimed that 
imagery effects can be explained by appeal to attention (and thus, that imagery is 
nothing more than a form of attention). In this study, we used a size manipulation 
to demonstrate that imagery and attention are distinct processes. We reasoned that 
if participants are asked to perform each function (imagery and attention) using 
stimuli of two different sizes (large and small), and that stimulus size affects the 
two functions differently, then we could conclude that imagery and attention are 
distinct cognitive processes. Our analyses showed that participants performed the 
imagery task with greater facility at a large size, whereas attention was performed 
more easily using smaller stimuli. This finding demonstrates that imagery and 
attention are distinct cognitive processes.         Dissociation Between Visual Attention and  
              Visual Mental Imagery 
 
Visual  mental  imagery  involves  creating,  interpreting,  and  transforming  visual 
internal representations (while "seeing with the mind's eye") whereas attention involves 
selecting  some  information  for  more  detailed  processing  (while  discarding  other 
information). Thus, at first glance, the two functions appear distinct. Nevertheless, some 
researchers have claimed that mental imagery effects do not reflect characteristics of a 
distinct  form  of  internal  representation,  but  rather  are  best  understood  as  products  of 
attention. Pylyshyn (e.g., 1989, 2002, 2003), for example, has proposed that results from 
many  "imagery"  experiments  actually  reflect  the  allocation  of  attention  to  different 
portions of the space that would be occupied by an image. Pylyshyn (2002, p. 158) states 
that “…the use of visual indexes and focal attention provides a satisfactory explanation 
for how spatial properties are inherited from the observed scene, without any need to 
posit spatial properties of images.” For example, when visualizing a house on a blank 
wall, they may think “the front door would be where the speck on the wall is”, with 
attention's  being  allocated  to  different  regions  of  space  as  the  image  is  constructed 
descriptively.  
Similarly, Pani (2002) has echoed Pylyshyn's view that phenomena attributed to 
mental imagery (such as the visualization of letters within a 4x5-cell grid) are actually 
due to the allocation of attention to defined regions of space. This idea gains credence 
because Craver-Lemley and Reeves (1992) have shown that imagery and attention can interact in some circumstances: in particular, when attention is divided, the Perky effect 
(i.e., the interference with perceiving that is produced by a mental image occupying the 
same space as a foveal visual percept) is half of that observed when attention is focused. 
If the Perky effect is taken as evidence that imagery and perception rely partly on the 
same neural systems, then the fact that divided attention decreases the effect whereas 
focused attention increases it could suggest that imagery effects arise, at least in part, 
from focused visual attention. We should note, however, that this effect of attention on 
imagery/perception  interference  only  occurs  when  the  perceptual  targets  are  in  the 
periphery of the visual field. 
There  is  also  increasing  evidence  that  both  visual  imagery  (e.g.,  Kosslyn  & 
Thompson, 2003; Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis, 2006) and visual attention can lead to 
increased activity in early visual cortex (e.g., Silver, Ress, & Heeger, 2005), and attention 
may enhance performance of tasks that rely on this neural structure (e.g., Hopfinger & 
West, 2006). These results make it difficult to disentangle effects due to imagery versus 
attention (but, see Offen, Schluppeck & Heeger [2009] for evidence that attention and 
visual short-term memory rely on different processes in early visual cortex). In addition, 
Grossberg (2000) has suggested that a combination of mismatched attentional and top-
down expectancy effects can give rise to the experience of perceiving a stimulus in its 
absence in the case of schizophrenic hallucinations.  
However, Ishai, Haxby, and Ungerleider (2002) conducted a neuroimaging study in 
which  they  explicitly  examined  the  effects  of  attention  on  imagery  processing.  They 
asked participants to visualize famous faces, and in one condition, asked them to focus 
their attention on a particular feature of the face (such as nose or lips). They found that requiring  attention  during  imagery  increased  activation  in  some  frontal  and  parietal 
regions (only a subset of areas activated by imagery), suggesting that the two processes 
are different. On the other hand, this result could be interpreted as showing that focusing 
attention to particular features represents higher resolution imagery to the target area, and 
so  the  study  may  not  be  considered  a  direct  comparison  of  imagery  and  attention 
processes.  
If attention and imagery rely on distinct mental processes, then there should exist 
some variables that affect imagery and attention differently. The size at which people are 
asked to perform an attention or an imagery task may be one variable that affects each 
function differently. In particular, for attention, there is evidence that people have more 
difficulty detecting faint visual signals if their attention is distributed over a large area 
than a small one (Eriksen & St. James, 1986); conversely, for imagery, they have more 
difficulty detecting parts of a visualized object if the image is small than if the image is 
large (e.g., Kosslyn, 1975).  Along the same lines, they also have poorer memory for 
objects  visualized  at  small  sizes  versus  large  sizes  (Kosslyn  &  Alper,  1977).  In  the 
present study, we compare directly the effects of size in imagery versus attention using 
matched paradigms with the same participants .  
If imagery and attention rely on the same processes, then manipulating the size of 
objects to be attended to or to be visualized should have the same effect. If, on the other 
hand, varying the size of the objects on which processing takes place produces different 
results for imagery and attention, then the two functions cannot rely on identical sorts of 
processing  --  and  we  are  justified  in  concluding  that  imagery  cannot  be  reduced  to 
attention.  Method 
Participants 
The participants were 38 volunteers (17 females and 21 males) recruited from the 
Harvard University Department of Psychology Study Pool website. One female and five 
males were excluded from the study because they failed to understand the instructions in 
at least one task. Data from the 32 participants (16 females and 16 males) who 
successfully performed all tasks were retained for further analysis. The majority of the 
participants were Harvard undergraduate students or local residents, with a mean age of 
23.5 years (range: 18 to 35 years).  All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants were compensated by payment of $10 or awarding of course credits. The 
study was approved by the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Committee 
on the use of Human Subjects and participants were tested according to all applicable 
guidelines and regulations governing the use of human participants in research. 
Materials 
Test stimuli were programmed into the PsyScope display program (Cohen, 
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) and were presented on a 15-inch Macintosh 
computer. Two conditions were administered to each participant: attention and imagery. 
In the attention condition, participants were asked to focus on a square at the center of the 
screen. The square could be presented at either a large or small size (see details below). 
Once participants had focused their attention on the square, a small dot appeared (on half 
the trials) somewhere within the boundaries of the square and participants were asked to 
indicate, by pressing a key on the computer keyboard, when they detected the appearance of the dot. The large square measured 16.5 x 16.5 cm and the small square 1.8 X 1.8 cm. 
The squares had white interiors surrounded by a black frame. The black dot that could 
appear in the square measured approximately 1 mm
 x 1 mm. For each square, eight 
positions were defined where the dot might appear, and all were 2/3 of the distance from 
the center to the edge of the square and of equal distance to each other. Figure 1 
illustrates all the possible positions of the dots. The 48 trials were divided into two blocks 
of 24 trials. Each block consisted of a series of 24 trials that were to be performed at 
either a large or small size (using the appropriately sized square to set the area of 
attention or the size of the object to be visualized). 
  The design of the imagery condition was identical to that of the attention 
condition, except that, after the dot detection portion of the task, participants were asked 
to make an additional judgment about whether a common object or animal possessed a 
particular feature. Thus, two sound files were presented on each imagery trial: the first 
was the name of the object (to cue participants to visualize it) and the second the 
characteristic (on which participants judged the object they had visualized). To ensure 
that the time devoted to visualizing the objects would be similar across the set of objects, 
every sound file was recorded to last approximately one second. The length of each 
object name never exceeded six syllables.  
  For the imagery condition, we selected 48 common objects or animals from a 
larger set of approximately 100 objects. The investigators produced a list of common 
objects and, for each object, a property that the authors used imagery to verify (for 
example, “elephant” – “hanging ears”). These objects and their properties were pilot 
tested with a group of 26 college-age participants and we retained only those combinations where at least two thirds of the participants provided the correct response, 
indicating that they knew what the object was, could visualize it, and were able to 
visualize the property or characteristic in question.  The questions were selected so that 
half were true (i.e, the property was in fact a characteristic of the object) and half were 
false (the property was not a characteristic of the object). The objects and accompanying 
properties were then divided into two groups of equal difficulty to be counterbalanced 
across size conditions of the study. The test items included animals, symbols, plants, 
signs, and cartoon characters. The properties included body parts, color, direction (e.g. 
direction of arrows of the recycling symbol), shape, position, and quantity (e.g. number 
of rings of the Olympic symbol). See Table 1 for a list of the items included in the study. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a small room with the lights on, and were 
seated at approximately 60 cm from the computer screen. Each received both the 
attention and imagery conditions, with the order counterbalanced over participants. A test 
session lasted approximately 60 min, about half of which were spent on the computer-
administered tasks and the rest to a set of written questionnaires. Each condition was 
composed of two blocks of trials, one where participants attended to (in the attention 
condition) or visualized within (in the imagery condition) an area defined by a large 
square and one block where they attended to or visualized within an area defined by a 
small square. The order of the size blocks was counterbalanced, so that half of the 
participants began with the block of "large" trials, while the other half began with the 
"small" trials.  Thus, each participant completed four blocks in all: attention condition with large 
square, attention condition with small square, imagery condition with large square and 
imagery condition with small square. Each block started with detailed instructions and 
four practice trials to familiarize the participant with the task. To ensure that participants 
understood the instructions correctly, they were asked to paraphrase them to the 
investigator before beginning the practice trials. At that point, any necessary 
clarifications were made.  
          Attention Condition 
Participants were asked to pay attention to an empty square (either large or small, 
depending on the block of trials) on the computer screen. They were asked to focus their 
attention on the square, and when they were ready (they were allowed as much time as 
they felt was needed to fully focus their attention) they pressed the spacebar.  Once the 
spacebar was pressed, there was a delay, following which, on half the trials, a black dot 
would appear for 20 ms. The exact timing of the dot's appearance was varied from trial to 
trial so that participants could not predict the specific time when the dot might appear; 
this required them to remain vigilant. Specifically, the delay (after the spacebar was 
pressed) was either 1.5, 2.0, or 2.5 s, and this timing was counterbalanaced across trials, 
where no more than two consecutive trials with dots had the same delay duration, and 
every duration occurred an equal number of times (approximately) in the first and the 
second half of a 24-trial block.  
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible by 
pressing the “yes” key ("yes" and "no" labels were affixed to the "b" and "n" keys respectively) on the keyboard as soon as they saw the dot. When no dot appeared, the 
empty square persisted for 4 s and another trial ensued. There was a 250 ms interval 
between trials. On trials where no dot appeared, participants were instructed simply not to 
respond. If the participants mistakenly thought that they had seen a dot (which in fact did 
not appear) and responded with the “yes” key within 4 s, the trial would be terminated 
and followed by the next trial after a 250 ms interval. If the “yes” key was not pressed 
within 4 s, the participant’s response would be considered “no dot”. The end of each trial 
was signaled by a beep. No more than 3 trials of the same type could occur in a row. On 
trials where a dot did appear, the location of the dot was counterbalanced within a block 
of trials. In addition, the same dot position never appeared in consecutive trials, and could 
only appear once or twice in each the first set of 12 and the second set of 12 trials of the 
block.  
Imagery Condition 
A judgment task based on the properties of the visualized objects was 
incorporated into the imagery condition in addition to the dot detection task. Participants 
were presented with an empty square at the beginning of each trial, either large or small 
depending on the block.  After 1 s, a word sound file named an object (e.g., “elephant”), 
which the participants were asked to visualize. They were instructed to create a vivid 
mental image that filled in the square without overflowing it, and to project that image 
onto the screen. The participants were to press the spacebar when a clear and vivid image 
had been completely generated. As in the attention condition, after 1.5, 2.0, or 2.5 s, a dot 
could appear briefly for 20 ms (the dot appeared on half of the trials). Participants were to 
press the “yes” key if they detected a dot or to wait four s without responding if they did not see a dot. The dot detection task ended once the “yes” key was pressed or after 4 s 
had passed without a response, with both situations being signaled by a beep. The 
participants were to maintain the vivid mental image of the cued object at all times while 
performing the dot detection task. After a 1 s delay, the participants heard a second word 
or phrase describing a characteristic that may or may not apply to the object that they 
were visualizing (e.g., “hanging ears”). Participants were instructed to decide whether the 
named characteristic pertained to the object by inspecting their mental image that had 
been projected on the square. The decision was indicated by pressing the “yes” or “no” 
key on the keyboard. Half of the trials required a "yes" response and the other half 
required a "no" response. The correct answers to the questions were never the same more 
for than three trials in a row. There were 6 questions with “yes” as the correct response 
and 6 with “no” as the correct response in each set of 12 trials within a block. No time 
limit was imposed on the task. A beep sound indicated that the response had been 
recorded and a new trial began 250 ms after each response.      
The objects used in the imagery task were pilot-tested and divided into two 
groups that were equated for difficulty. The two sets of objects were counterbalanced 
over order and size of the image to avoid potential confounds.  
Questionnaires 
Following the computer-administered tasks, we asked the participants to complete 
a series of questionnaires on mental imagery, a personal health history to assess their 
vision and hearing, and the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), which 
measures the preference in the use of hands for daily life activities.  Results 
We analyzed the time to detect the dots in both the attention and imagery 
conditions and the time to evaluate the properties in the imagery task. We first discarded 
response times (RTs) of incorrect responses and those that were greater than 2.5 standard 
deviations greater or smaller than the cell mean for that participant. Approximately 1% of 
the trials were excluded overall. The error rates for dot detection included trials where the 
participant missed the dot (misses) and where he or she incorrectly responded “yes” in 
the trials without a dot (false alarms). We also analyzed the time spent on focusing 
attention on the square for dot detection in the attention condition and that on generating 
the mental image of the named object in the square in the imagery condition. Finally, we 
calculated d' and beta for each participant for the dot detection task in both the attention 
and imagery conditions. 
Size effects in attention versus imagery 
We began by examining the data most relevant for our hypothesis. We conducted 
a 2 (imagery judgment vs. dot detection in the attention condition) x 2 (task performed at 
large vs. small size) ANOVA for both response times (RT) and error rates (ER). 
   RT analysis. Participants required less time in the dot detection task in the 
attention condition (398 ms) than they did to make judgments about objects they had 
visualized in the imagery condition (1139 ms), F (1, 31) = 75.95, MSE =230844, p 
< .0001. No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
  ER analysis. Participants made fewer errors in detecting dots in the attention task 
when the size of the square was small (0.9%) than when it was large (6.3%), whereas in the imagery task (in which they judged characteristics of objects), they made fewer errors 
when the size of the square, onto which the image was projected, was large (15.4%), than 
when the square was small (20.4%), F(1,31) = 37.3, MSE =0.002, p< .0001. Post-hoc 
contrasts revealed that the differences between each size pair (large and small) were 
significant in both the attention, F(1,31)= 19.77, MSE =0.002, p < .0001, and the imagery, 
F(1,31)= 17.56, MSE =0.002, p < .0002, tasks. See Figure 2 for an illustration of these 
results. 
In addition to the interaction, we also found that participants made fewer errors in 
the attention condition overall (3.6%) than in the imagery judgment condition overall 
(17.9%), F(1,31) = 106.55, MSE =0.006, p < .0001.  
Dot detection in imagery versus attention 
   Because smaller images are denser in their features and because visual images can 
interfere with like-modality perception, we conjectured that the dot detection effect 
(facilitation when attending to a small region of space) might be attenuated during the 
small-size imagery condition because the smaller, denser image might interfere more 
with the detection of the dot. Thus, we compared dot detection in the imagery and 
attention conditions, at the large and small size. We used a 2 x 2 ANOVA design. 
  RT analysis. Participants required more time to detect the dot during the imagery 
condition (532 ms) than during the attention condition (398 ms), F(1,31) = 92.3, MSE 
=6229, p < .0001. Participants required more time overall to detect the dot when the 
square was large (487 ms) than when the square was small (444 ms), F (1, 31) = 27.6, MSE = 27.62, p < .0001. The interaction between the two factors was not significant, F 
(1,31) = 0.48, MSE =2311. 
  ER analysis. Participants made more errors in dot detection when the square was 
large (6.5%) than when it was small (1.7%), F(1,31) = 16.46, MSE =0.005, p = .0003.  
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
  We found no effects of image generation time, nor of time to focus attention. 
Signal detection analysis 
Signal detection analyses allow us to consider both the participant's sensitivity to 
a given target (d') as well as any response biases toward “yes” or “no” responses (beta) 
when signaling that they have or have not detected the target. 
Size effects in Attention and Imagery dot detection. We began with a 2 x 2 
ANOVA comparing dot detection in the two conditions (attention and imagery) and at 
the two sizes (large and small square). We conducted separate analyses for d' and beta as 
the independent variables. For d', the analysis revealed only that the participants had 
greater sensitivity to the dot when the square was small (mean = 3.3) rather than large 
(mean = 2.9), F(1, 31) = 17.78, MSE =0.225, p = .0002. No other main effect or 
interaction was significant. The same analysis for beta revealed a higher value (and thus, 
a greater bias toward "no" responses) in the imagery condition (mean = 0.18) than in the 
attention condition (mean = 0.12), F(1,31) = 5.92, MSE =0.02, p < .03. There was also a 
main effect for size, with participants showing higher beta values  (a stronger tendency 
toward "no" responses) in the large (mean = .22) rather than the small condition, (mean 
= .08), F(1, 31), MSE =0.05,  p< .002. These results may be explained by a greater number of misses in the imagery condition, compared to the attention condition, and in 
the large square condition compared to the small square condition. No other main effects 
or interactions were significant.  
The analyses of the questionnaire data did not reveal any significant findings of 
theoretical importance, and thus we do not report those data here. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we compared the effects of varying the size of the target on which 
we asked participants to perform either an attention or an imagery task. We reasoned that 
if the size manipulation affected the two types of functions differently, we could rule out 
the possibility that imagery and attention relied on the same type of processing. Our 
results confirmed that imagery and attention can be dissociated.  
   This result is not surprising, for many reasons. First, the claim that imagery is 
nothing more than focused attention fails to account for the many mental imagery results 
found when participants' eyes are closed (see, for example, Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis 
[2006] for a review). Although Pylyshyn's (1989, 1998, 2003) spatial indexing 
explanation might be considered plausible when eyes are open, it is unclear how such a 
system would work when no indexes were visible.   
  In addition, several studies have compared attention and imagery, and the results 
have suggested that they differ. For example, Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn (2005) 
showed that when participants are asked to visualize a flickering checkerboard wedge rotating, the retinotopic activation maps, as measured by functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), more closely resemble retinotopic perceptual maps (resulting from 
actual viewing of the stimuli) than when participants are asked to pay attention to the 
region of space that would be occupied by the checkerboard. 
 We note that dot detection was less efficient in the imagery condition than in the 
attention condition. Though this result may, at first blush, appear to provide 
complementary evidence that the two functions are separate, there are other possible 
interpretations we must consider. This finding may be due to the increased effort or 
cognitive load required to perform two tasks at once (in the imagery task, participants are 
required both to detect the dot and to visualize and evaluate an image). Dot detection may 
require more time in such cases simply because performing both tasks is more effortful, 
and fewer resources can be devoted to each. Relatedly, participants may require more 
time to detect the dot during imagery because the cognitive load of performing both tasks 
is greater and this adds an additional level of executive processing. 
 In addition, this result is likely to represent a Perky effect, whereby visual imagery 
interferes with visual perception. The conditions found to be most favorable for the Perky 
effect to occur are present in this paradigm: Ishai and Sagi (1997) found that 
imagery/perception interference was greatest when images of common objects were 
formed from long-term memory (as was the case in our study) rather than short-term 
memory. Craver-Lemley and Arterberry (2001) showed that interference effects were 
strongest when the image overlapped the percept in a dot detection task. Indeed, our 
participants were instructed to fill the entire square, regardless of the size at which they 
were visualizing. Although, as mentioned above, attention has been found to influence the Perky effect under some conditions, there is consensus that the effect cannot be 
wholly explained by attention (Craver-Lemley & Arterberry, 2001). The main effect of 
poorer dot detection during imagery is therefore inconclusive with respect to the 
relationship between attention and imagery. On the other hand, the interaction with size – 
producing opposite effects in each function – is unambiguous and is strong evidence for 
the dissociation. 
  How, then, should we explain that attention and imagery may interact in some 
cases, as demonstrated by Craver-Lemley and Reeves (1992), or the visual indexing 
results shown by Pylyshyn (see, for example, Pylyshyn, 2003)? We propose that attention 
may be an important component in imagery generally -- one must, after all, pay attention 
to one’s image and its component parts in order, for example, to inspect the image. Just 
as one would not replace the concept of "perception" with that of "attention" simply 
because attention is used in perception, one should not replace the concept of "imagery" 
with "attention" simply because attention plays a role in processing mental images. 
Moreover, attention may be particularly important in certain forms of imagery that rely 
on external visual stimuli and on spatial locations, such as when one pays attention to a 
tile floor and sees patterns of numbers formed by the tiles. However, when there are no 
external stimuli to guide one’s image and the image features a complex shape that must 
be created from memory and either projected onto a blank screen or produced when the 
eyes are closed, then such images must be created on the basis of internal long-term 
memory representations – and this process may not be explained by appealing to 
attention allocation. It is difficult to explain, for example, how the complex features of a 
high-resolution image might arise from differential distribution of attention. How would attention represent complex features such as shape or texture? The results are clear: 
imagery and attention exist as distinct cognitive phenomena. 
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Cortex, 15, 1570-1583.  Table 1. List of imagery items and properties, divided in to "true" and "false" groups. 
True 
Elephant   hanging ears 
American flag  blue stars 
Cube   8 corners 
Star of David  6 points 
Cell phone keypad  0 at bottom 
Tic-tac-toe game  4 lines 
Kayak  two pointed ends 
Stop sign  8 sides 
Bald eagle  hooked beak 
Horse   pointy ears 
Panda  black ears 
Sea lion  flippers 
Maple leaf  jagged edge 
Penguin  white belly 
Olympic symbol  5 rings 
Superman logo  red letter S 
Mickey Mouse  gloves 
Charlie Chaplin  mustache 
Traffic light  red on top 
Eiffel Tower  4 legs 
Face of 1-dollar bill  George Washington 
Pepsi symbol   red on top 
American flag  red stripe on top 
Ronald McDonald  striped socks 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 (continued) 
False 
Pig  round ears 
Donkey  hanging ears 
Mercedes symbol  3 curved lines 
Parking meter  flat top 
Washington Monument  dome 
Statue of Liberty  torch in left hand 
Elvis Presley   mustache 
Chicken  webbed feet 
Nike symbol  higher than wide 
George Washington  beard 
Ace of clubs  4 leaves 
Kangaroo  short tail 
Honeycomb  5 sides 
Apple logo  bitten left side 
Star fish  6 points 
Egyptian pyramid  triangular bottom 
Fire Hydrant   square shape 
Recycling symbol  counterclockwise arrows 
American passport  wider than high 
Starbucks symbol  triangular shape 
Albert Einstein   glasses 
Sphinx  standing 
Cookie Monster  green fur 
Winnie the Pooh  red nose 
  
Figure 1. A model of the type of square used in the attention and imagery conditions with dots at 
all 8 possible locations. The small square measured 1.8 cm x 1.8 cm and the large square 
measured 16.5 cm x 16.5 cm. Both sizes of square were used in the imagery and attention 
conditions. The dots, which measured approximately 1 mm x 1 mm, remained at the same size 
regardless of whether the square was presented at a large or small size. 
 
 Figure 2. Errors in attention and imagery conditions performed at large and small size. 
 
 